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Can the FDA Keep Kosher?
Regulation of kosher claims on product labels
Product labels blast their message through the supermarket aisles, vying to
attract the attention of consumers. However, the advertising means available
to manufacturers are limited by laws that regulate the claims that they may
make. Regulation of kosher claims on food packaging implicates many of these
general labeling issues, as well as several unique problems involving freedom of
religion. The presence of religious issues provides a stronger justication for
State involvement, as well as a stronger reason for keeping a distance. One
court defended regulation by arguing that [r]ather than to prohibit the free
exercise of religion, the [kosher labeling] ordinance serves to safeguard the ob-
servance of its tenets and to prohibit actions which improperly would interfere
therewith.1 Contrast such logic with the core American belief that a union of
government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.2
There are convincing and pressing concerns on both sides of every debate that
force this paper to progress by arguing itself from one corner into another. The
same issues keep recurring, and although resolution may be impossible, it is
important to clarify the options and the surrounding debates in order to reach
an accommodation that can achieve the goal of consumer protection without
compromising individual liberties.
Introduction: The Kosher Food Industry
Over the past several decades, the kosher food industry has become increas-
ingly protable. In the late 1970's only about 1000 products were certied
kosher.3 In 1993, the number of certied products had grown to 23,600~ and by
the end of 1996, exceeded 3 i,000.5 Ad Week has cited kosher food as one of the
hottest products in 1989.6 Various estimates put the current yearly growth rate
at anywhere between eleven and fteen percent, with consistent increases over
the past ve years.7
Many food conglomerates have been expanding into the kosher market. In
1993, two American food giants, Conagra and Sara Lee, acquired the two largest
kosher meat companies, continuing a trend of such acquisitions.8 In a similar
expansion, thousands of mainstream marketers have begun to target the kosher
population. In recent years, Nestle, Hershey, Coca-Cola, Kraft, General Mills
and Coors have all added kosher certication.9 In late 1997, Nabisco added
certication to a wide range of snacks in a move calculated to
io
engender national publicity. The increased interest in the kosher market is part
of a
1larger marketing movement focusing on specic classes of consumers. John
McMillan, a
22
food industry analyst at Prudential Bache, explains that the food industry
as a whole is not growing in either units or prices. As a result, everyone is
targeting specialty growth areas. That's what kosher is all about. Investors are
hungry for businesses with reliable growth and loyal customers, and because of
kosher food's premium prices, investors can expect generous prot margins.
The market has created a unique niche where many sectors of the food in-
dustry, including production, distribution, and marketing, must routinely take
into account the Jewish dietary laws as they carry out their business activities.
Companies are no longer unsophisticated about the meaning of kosher. They
no longer dene kosher as food having been blessed by a rabbi, but understand
that kashrut is determined by the means of the manufacture and the ingredients
that are used. This has made kosher products available to the kosher consumer
on the broadest scale possible.~~i2 While this joint venture between industry
and the religious community has beneted both sides, there is an inherent di-
vergence in focus that has created a need for regulatory enforcement. In part,
the problem stems from the tremendous complexity of the dietary laws. While
broad principles of law can be formulated, the application is subject to a myr-
iad of fact specic contingencies. This complexity precludes easy answers for
industry as well as easy clear standards to determine compliance.
The Laws of Kosher Food
The laws of kosher food, or kashrut, regulate both the foods that may be
eaten and the methods of preparation that may be used. In one sense, the most
concrete issue involves the identity of forbidden foods. Animals which chew
their cud and have completely split hooves are permitted.13 Fish that have ns
and removable scales are permitted. i4 All fruits and vegetables are kosher.
However, certain defects or imperfections will render even a kosher animal non-
kosher.15 In addition, specic parts of permitted animals, such as blood,i6 as
well as certain nerves'7 and fats'8 are prohibited.
However, the method of preparation is an issue equally as important as
the identity of the food. Meat must be ritually slaughtered19 and then soaked
and salted under specic conditions, or roasted over an open ame to remove
the blood.20 Even ingredients derived from kosher animals are not kosher if the
slaughter was improper. Fruits and vegetables must be scrubbed to remove non-
kosher waxes and sprays and thoroughly checked for forbidden insects. Prepa-
ration or storage of kosher products in equipment or vessels used in preparation
of non-kosher products also renders them unkosher.2' A recent Maryland case
involved kosher hot dogs placed in a rotisserie next to non-kosher sausages and
hot dogs. The grease from the non-kosher food would contaminate the kosher
hot dogs, causing them to lose their kosher status.22
Jewish law also forbids the mixture of meat and dairy products.23 Such
products may not be cooked or eaten together. In order to make this division
complete, the rabbis decreed that entirely separate sets of utensils which must
not be used washed or stored together are required for meat and dairy foods.24
33
Although much of the law is widely accepted, there are dierences over
specic principles as well as debates regarding their application.
Some standards are subject to categorical disagreement. For example, only
those birds for which there is a tradition of kashrza are permitted.25 Birds such
as pheasant,
26
quail, or turkey are not recognized by some Jewish communities. Another
area of
dispute relates to determination of the imperfections that would invalidate a
kosher animal. In order for meat to be kosher, the lungs must be smooth, with-
out puncture. One opinion permits a nding of certain tissue adhesions, classify-
ing them as independent growths. The higher standard of glatt, maintains that
any adhesions are evidence of a prior puncture, invalidating the slaughter.27
Orthodox and Conservative authorities also dier on several basic standards.
Conservative Judaism accepts sturgeon, swordsh, all cheeses, and all wines as
kosher. Orthodox authorities do not accept the kashru of sturgeon or swordsh.
In addition, Orthodoxy accepts only cheeses and wines that have fullled certain
legal requirements that the Conservative movement no longer deems applicable.
Gelatin made from the bones of non-kosher animals is accepted by Conservative
but not Orthodox Jewry.28
Orthodox and Conservative rabbis also disagree on whether dishwashers can
be used to clean both meat and dairy utensils. Conservative, and some Orthodox
authorities allow warm water to be used to dress slaughtered poultry. Other
Orthodox authorities insist on the use of cold water because hot water might
cause the blood to coagulate or might slightly cook the meat before it is properly
soaked and salted.29
Most often, the key factor in kosher supervision is not the explicit standards
that are employed, but the trust in the level of supervisory oversight.
Kosher Supervision
Even if the food itself is kosher, it will not be accepted without the guarantee
of a supervisor who oversees both the ingredients and the methods of production
that are used. A simple listing of the ingredients is not enough to provide
assurance for the kosher consumer. As mentioned above, the laws of kashrui
extend to the equipment and methods of production that are used, information
which does not appear on the food label. The routine cleaning processes that
companies employ do not necessarily meet the strictures of kosherization and,
thus, products subsequently produced are rendered non-kosher as well. 30
In addition, the current laws allow for certain ambiguities in labeling. For
example, the nomenclature used for listing ingredients often gives no hint of
the actual ingredients being used,31 Natural cherry avor, often contains oil of
cognac, a derivative of nonkosher wine, as well as animal derivatives. Vegetable
shortening is another innocent label that can conceal serious kashrut concerns.
Many varieties of vegetable shortening contain
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considerable percentages of emulsiers which may be animal derived. Even
pure vegetable shortening may be rened on equipment which has been used for
the rendering of lard or other animal fats.32
Some ingredients need not be listed at all.33 Many processing aids, such as
the release agent used in the manufacture of hard candy are often made from
fats and oil of animal origin.34 The chutes used to drain pure maple syrup or
molasses are often greased with lard to improve viscosity. The wide variety of
substances developed to enhance the color or texture of a product create the
need for even stricter investigation and monitoring. Meat tenderizers can be
diluted or standardized with lactose | a dairy ingredient. Soya our can be
treated with an enzyme isolated from the stomach of a swine, a non-kosher
animal.35
Kashrut observance has always been predicated on a basic policy of trust.36
The rule is that the individual supplying or certifying the kosher article must
be trustworthy within the standards of Jewish law. He must be a ne 'eman,
one trusted not to deceive or contravene any kosher law, in addition to main-
taining general Jewish law observance and standards of behavior.37 For this
reason Orthodox decisors have ruled that ritual slaughter by a Conservative
Jew is invalid.38 Similar problems of legal trustworthiness arise with regard to
supervision by the manufacturer. Non-Jewish food industry management may
understand how these laws specically aect their own product without under-
standing the religious signicance that they hold for the kosher consumer, the
depth of concern for this consumer group or the resulting vocabulary used by
these consumers' leaders, the rabbis.39
Some situations may permit a certain amount of leeway in the strictness of
the oversight. For example, there is a principle codied in the Code of Jewish law
that a craftsman will not damage his integrity by making any false statement.40
The late, well-known rabbinic authority, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, applied this
principle, broadening it to include governmental control of a product which
adds the dimension of fear of penalty for non-compliance. There was an early
rabbiic prohibition on the use of unsupervised milk, out of concern for mixture
with, or use of, milk from non-kosher animals.41 Rabbi Feinstein permits the
use of government supervised milk from commercial milk companies because
they are regulated and subject to penalties for infraction of any rules concerning
substitution of any other type of milk.42 However, this leniency is not universally
accepted.43
Most often a controversy over supervision will hinge on this type of issue, not
the standards that are employed, but trust in the level of oversight. For example,
the law in its essential form allows for certain assumptions to be made, however,
these presumptions are invalidated in a case of reasonable doubt. In checking
an animal for imperfections after slaughter, certain observations might indicate
a need for further investigation. Another example of such an issue involves the
inspection of vegetables. Most insects are not kosher and vegetables must be
rigorously inspected. In some cases, only a representative part of a sample need
be checked, yet in a case where questions arise due to results of
5other inspections or variation in the amount of pesticide used, the supervisor
must make a judgment call
Historically, kashrut supervision was in the hands of the local rabbinate
and the situation was a relatively uncomplicated one in that the supervising
rabbi had within his control the entire complement of ingredients which were
used in production. With the growth of the modern food industry, this type
of system has become impossible to maintain, and large supervisory agencies
have developed. The largest is the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations
(OU), which supervises seventy to eighty percent of the kosher products in the
United States today. Kashrut regulations are established by contract between a
manufacturer and the OU. The level of supervision is determined by the nature
of the product being manufactured. If the product is relatively innocuous, the
level of supervision will be limited, but those products whose kashrui status is
complicated by their special [legal] status, like cheese, wine, and meat, require
constant supervision.
Kosher Consumers
As discussed above, the availability of a dened market of repeat customers
creates an incentive to market foods as kosher. Because of the increased expense
in securing constant supervision, manufacturers can charge more for kosher
products, particularly kosher meat. These factors combine to create a situation
that rewards fraud in labeling kosher products.
The large national agencies use trademarked symbols to identify their su-
pervisory approval. However, there is no such limitation on the use of the terms
kosher or kosher style on the label of a product. Similarly, marks consisting of
individual letters such as K cannot be regulated. In the United States there are
currently over fty individual rabbis or organizations which use the letter K to
signify their supervision. In addition, large agencies such as the OU are involved
only in the supervision of companies that have national or regional distribution.
Local food establishments are generally not handled by the OU, whose policy
is that such establishments are more eectively and eciently overseen by the
local rabbinate.47
Consumers expecting to purchase food that complies with certain standards
can easily be deceived. While some areas of the Orthodox community carefully
monitor products that represent themselves as kosher, there is a wide range
of consumers concerned about the kashrut of their food who do not have ac-
cess to this information.48 The market for kosher consumers is estimated to be
approaching $3 billion annually. Currently, more than 75% of certied kosher
foods are purchased by non-Jews.49
Muslims and Seventh Day Adventists rely on kosher labeling to stay away
from religiously prohibited foods. Prohibited substances include meat from a
swine, or any meat that is not slaughtered in accordance with specic guidelines,
as well as any fermented substance. According to the Center for American
Muslim Research and
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Information, approximately six million Muslims live in the United States
and about 75% of them observe religious dietary restrictions)0
Vegetarians provide another rapidly increasing market for kosher foods. In-
novative kosher food technologists have developed imitation non-kosher meats
such as mock sausage, as well as products that combine dairy and meat such as
soy
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cheeseburgers. The label pareve, used to indicate a product completely free
of meat
and dairy products, is a standard that appeals to veegans who morally oppose
the use of any products derived from animals. The pareve label is also important
to consumers with lactose intolerance or milk allergies.
The vast majority of those who seek out kosher products do so out of health
concerns. Articles highlighting kosher food have recently appeared in a wide
range of popular publications including Shape and Glamour. An on-line maga-
zine writes that millions of Americans from all ethnic backgrounds and religions
look for the kosher label on foods as a sign of quality. For a food to be la-
beled 'kosher,' it must meet rigorous rules pertaining to cleanliness, purity and
wholesomeness.52 Similarly, a supervisory agency advertises its services, not-
ing that along with society's increased interest in health and tness, comes
an awareness that products endorsed with kosher certication must meet stan-
dards which exceed government regulations...it endows products with an aura of
wholesomeness and quality in the eyes of the educated consumer.53 Marketers
have latched on to this trend, hoping that people will pay the fteen to twenty
percent premium for kosher products because they assume these products are
produced under exacting, guaranteed controls. Prudential food analyst, John
MeMillan, observes that in recent years, the kosher seal has become equivalent
to what the Good Housekeeping seal meant in the 50's54
Many people believe that kosher foods, especially meats, are more sanitary
because they are subject to constant supervision. Hebrew National's old slogan
we answer to a higher authority taps into this quest for purity. The Barghout
court noted that the bulk of kosher shoppers appear to be consumers who believe
the kosher certication...means higher quality food. Many members of the public
have a notion that the Kosher processes of meat preparation are under closer
scrutiny than are those of the general producer, since they are supervised by
State and federal health authorities as well as rabbinic personnel.55 The court
in People v Atlas also commented favorably on the caliber of food prepared
under such regulations: Kosher meat is selected with great care, and especial
cleanliness is observed in the slaughter thereof, form which a reasonable inference
follows that it is of superior quality.56
Each of these groups of kosher consumers would be harmed by fraudulent
labeling of food packages. The Barghout court concluded that [w]hen all these
people|pious Jews, Moslems, individuals with health concerns, and quality
conscious shoppers|buy products designated 'kosher' they trust the food so
described is up to the promise. It is reasonable to assume that generally they
7would not want a product contaminated with non-kosher sausage grease.57 The
problem is compounded by the fact that many
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consumers are unaware of the specic requirements of Jewish law and rely
completely on the labels and packaging. Unscrupulous manufacturers, taking
advantage of this specialized market inict economic harms by charging more
for products that are not what is claimed. More importantly, they create un-
quantiable moral harms by tricking consumers into violating their religious or
ethical standards.
Government Regulation of Food Labels
In the United States, labeling claims on packaged foods are regulated by the
Food
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and Drug Administration. The agency's statutory authority is granted by the
Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, under which, adulteration and misbrand-
ing of food are criminal oenses.59 Section 403(a) of the act denes a food as
misbranded if it is false or misleading in any particular.60 Section 201(n)61 ex-
pands the denition of misleading to include not only the representations that
are made or suggested, but also material information that is omitted from the
label. The provisions regarding misbranding may also implicate the prohibition
against economic adulteration in 402(b), concerning a product that is of lesser
quality than the label represents it to be.
The Act provides little other guidance as to how to determine if a label is
misleading. In many cases, the line between advertising calculated to attract a
specic class consumers and misleading labeling can be hard to draw.
While the area of misbranded drugs has often been spotlighted, the regula-
tion of misbranded food was marked for years by a lack of enforcement. This
hands-o attitude led to a proliferation of false claims. A study of marketing
strategies in Adweek explains this trend in the context of the stagnating food
industry and the glut of copycat retail consumer goods. It became more dicult
to create and sustain a unique point of dierence..,the result was that adver-
tisers were pushed to create that dierence and it was harder to substantiate
it. Companies desperate to distinguish their products turned away from tra-
ditional advertising methods focusing on building long-term brand loyalty and
switched to short term bottom line sales pitches. Without any guidelines, com-
panies saw a window of opportunity to increase sales without a lot of capital.
Consumers backed them up with their wallets, buying into the myriad health
and environmental claims.62
Part of the reason behind FDA non-enforcement is that the agency must
work with limited resources, using about 1000 inspectors in the eld to police
the entire country. Mislabeled food often implicates purely economic concerns
and is therefore a less urgent enforcement priority than issues of public health.
One important case involved Manischewitz matzos labeled Diet Thins.63 FDA
contended that the name Diet Thins prominently displayed on the label's front
panel conveyed to consumers the misleading impression that the matzo crackers
9were lower calorically than other matzos and therefore useful in weight control
diets.64 The court emphasized that it is not necessary to show that anyone was
actually misled or deceived, or even that there was any intent to
65
deceive. The standard of analysis used was that of the weight conscious
consumer,
10S
part of a group of purchasers of diet products who are often pathetically
eager to obtain a
66
more slender gure and thus are especially susceptible to misleading claims.
Early in 1991, FDA embarked on a highly publicized policy of enhanced
enforcement of the FDCA in an eort to restore the credibility and the integrity
of the agency. Eorts were focused on widely-known companies and consumer
products. The rst evidence of the new commitment to stronger enforcement
was the seizure of 12,000 gallons of Proctor & Gamble's Citrus Hill Fresh Choice
orange juice in April, 1991, because the label of the processed juice allegedly
was misleading to consumers. This marked the rst time in years that a seizure
was prompted by complaints about a product's label.67
In general, however, enforcement of misbranded food has been limited to
cases of outright fraud. Apart from the lack of resources, there tend to be few
reported court decisions regarding misbranding due to the diculty in dening a
standard for comparison.68 The inability in most cases to use a factual standard
for comparison moves the debate into the realm of consumer perceptions. One
option in such a case is to apply the standards used in common law and statutory
false advertising cases, analyzing the likelihood that consumers would be mislead
on a material factor that would aect their purchasing decision. Although the
decision in the Diet Thins case essentially laid the groundwork for such an
approach, these issues basically turn on judgment calls by the courts69 and it is
logical that the agency would not want to get involved in such risky legislation
on a regular basis.
In many cases, FDA has chosen to create identity standards for various
common products.70 In a sense, this approach attempts to take care of the
prospective litigation within the administrative hearings used in setting the
standard. The hearings on the bread standard, for example took 10 years to
resolve and amassed a record of 17,000 pages.7' The peanut butter standard took
even longer to develop. Overall, FDA has promulgated nearly 300 standards of
identity, which at one time covered close to 45 percent of the wholesale value
of food shipped in interstate commerce.72
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1 99Q73 addresses the problem
of misleading labeling by setting mandatory standards for nutrition labeling
and strictly regulating the health claims that are permitted. In 1994, the FDA
issued regulations pursuant to the NLEA which are considered by some to be
the greatest changes to food labeling and advertising regulation in over fty
years.74
Even under the Nutrition Labeling Act, considerable ambiguity remains.75
For example, in recent years, marketers have been targeting the health food
market, another growing specialty niche, with claims such as natural and or-
ganic. FDA prohibits the term natural only on products containing articial
colors, avors, or chemical additives.76 Generally, natural foods are considered
to be those foods in their original state, or those which have undergone mini-
mal renement and processing.77 Advocates of natural foods proclaim that such
11products are safer and more nutritious than
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conventionally grown foods, but no scientic evidence exists for such claims.
Although such descriptions misrepresent products as superior to non-natural
foods, manufacturers eager to charge more for their products or reach a special-
ized target audience continue to capitalize on these beliefs. Products previously
devoid of additives now boast, all natural, no additives, no preservatives! Often
advertising by association is employed, and a product is deceptively pictured
among scenes of a natural environment. One manufacturer used the words nat-
ural lemon avored creme pie, where the cream consisted of sodium propionate,
certied food colors, sodium benzoate, and vegetable gum, explaining that the
word natural described the lemon avor which contained oil from lemon rinds.
FDA's reluctance to dene such terms anticipates the controversy that would
arise in attempting to agree on a single standard, as well as problems in the
subsequent application and enforcement. The FDCA continues to prohibit mis-
branding, but without explicit standards to give it meaning, enforcement will
be limited.78
Regulation of Kosher Labeling
Similar problems arise in the agency's attempt to deal with the term kosher.
Through August 1997, FDA's informal agency policy regarding the terms kosher
and kosher style in labeling was codied in the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR).79 Section 101.29 recommended that the term 'kosher' should be used
only on food products that meet certain religious dietary requirements, but did
not provide any guidance as to what comprise these requirements. In addition,
because the term kosher style would lead purchasers to think that a product is
kosher, the agency discourages its use on products that do not meet the religious
dietary requirements.
In 1997, as part of an initiative to develop a more ecient regulatory regime
and simplify the CFR, the kosher labeling provision was repealed, to be replaced
with a compliance policy guide.80 FDA believes that some statement on kosher
labeling is needed to prevent confusion and misinformation in the kosher food
industry which could lead to a proliferation of misbranded products.8' However,
the agency feels that regulation in the CFR is superuous, because [t]he use
of the terms kosher, kosher-style, and any other term suggesting that a food
has been prepared in accordance with certain religious practices is subject to
the general misbranding provisions of section 403(a) of the act....Aside from
providing this basic level of protection, FDA has no role in determining what
food is kosher.82 It is hard to see how the agency's statement provides any
guidance to the industry. The protection to consumers provided under 403
is also murky, since there must be some general idea of what is kosher, in
order to determine that there has been misleading deviation from this accepted
denition.
Marketers continue to capitalize on the ambiguity of the law. Once company
used the words pure beef salami in Hebrew letters to imply that the product was
kosher, with some success. New Jersey, which has some of the most extensive
kosher regulations in the country, regulates the inscription on food of any sign,
emblem, insignia, six pointed
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star, menorah, symbol or mark in simulation of the word kosher, or the use
in advertising of the words kosher style, kosher type, Jewish Hebrew, holiday
(Jewish) foods, traditional (Jewish) Bar Mitzvah, Bat Mitzvah,83 all of which
are techniques employed to attract consumers looking for kosher food.
Regulatory Options
Unlike the use of ambiguous terms such as organic or fresh, there is an even
greater need to regulate use of the term kosher because of the possibility of not
only economic, but also moral harm. Several approaches are possible. FDA
could enforce the 403(a) provision against misleading labels. The agency could
also adopt the approach taken by many states and create a substantive stan-
dard to aid in enforcement. Many have suggested that FDA could regulate in
a more hands-o' way, through disclosure requirements. Alternatively, the gov-
ernment could choose to delegate oversight to the states or attempt to privatize
enforcement. It is important to remember that there is no regulatory void. The
agency's decision not to police this type of fraud is itself a decision that allows
it to continue.84
Enforcement under the FDCA
FDA could initiate rulemaking that would go beyond policy suggestions, and
police the industry using its authority under 403(a). One comment regarding
the repeal of 101.29 argued that the proper course for FDA is not to remove
form the CFR its only pronouncement on kosher labeling, but to assume a higher
prole and initiate rulemaking that explicitly states its enforcement authority
with regard to use of the terms 'kosher' and 'kosher style,' thereby providing the
kosher consumer with eective and meaningful protection. As discussed above,
it is dicult to see how this could be an eective solution without involving a
substantive standard dening kashria.
FDA could provide such a substantive standard. This approach has been
taken by many of the individual states. In the absence of comprehensive fed-
eral legislation, states have often acted to protect their consumers from fraud.
Maine, for example, has instituted all inclusive legislation pertaining to the
words natural, organic, and health foods.85 Similarly, many states have created
a substantive denition for the term kosher. However, because such denitions
implicate religious concepts, the State's involvement raises the specter of un-
constitutional interference with religion. The state statutes and the subsequent
litigation surrounding them provide guidance as to a possible federal approach
to the issue.
State Kosher Laws
New York enacted the rst kosher food law in 1915, in response to the
chaotic state of the kosher food industry|its charlatans, proteers and outright
crooks|which, coupled with the huge inux of im.migrants who were unfamiliar
with local circumstances, made any assurance of kashru all by impossible.86
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Today, twenty two states and at least two cities have enacted kosher food
laws.87 The extent of enforcement and agency responsibility for enforcement
diers among the states. In nine states, state ocials, either alone or together
with local ocials, are responsible for enforcement. In other states, enforcement
of kosher food statutes rests with local prosecuting attorneys or local boards of
health.88
The principle provision of the current New York statute provides that a
person who with intent to defraud, sells or exposes for sale any meat or meat
preparations, article of food or food products and falsely represents the same to
be kosher or kosher for Passover ... or as having been prepared under, and of a
product or products sanctioned by the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements..
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.89 Subsequent litigation has indicated that
in spite of the disjunctive phrasing, the statute intends to identify kosher with
Orthodox Hebrew requirements. Other states have similarly dened kosher,
not by a list of specic requirements, but with reference to an entire body of
religious law. New Jersey, with a very strong kosher regulatory regime, denes
kosher food as prepared and maintained in strict compliance with the laws and
customs of the Orthodox Jewish religion. California's statute adopts an almost
identical standard, dening kosher as a strict compliance with every Jewish law
and custom, but expanding it to include the use of tools, implements, vessels,
utensils, dishes and containers that are used in the manufacture and treatment
of such meats and other products...9'
Some states have tried to include more specic requirements in their statutes.
The Illinois statutes attempt to take a more specic approach, dening kosher
as having been prepared under and of a product or products sanctioned by the
Code of Jewish Laws.92 Maryland has recently revised its statutes which simi-
larly dened kosher as prepared under and consisting of products sanctioned by
the Code of Jewish Laws, namely in the Shulehan Aruch.93 Michigan compro-
mises by dening kosher as prepared or processed in accordance with orthodox
Hebrew requirements by a recognized orthodox religious council.94 Minnesota
uses similar language of prepared or processed in accordance with orthodox
Hebrew religious requirements sanctioned by a recognized rabbiic council.95
Other states adopt a broad, general denition, without explicit reference to
a particular sect of Judaism. Arizona, for example, denes kosher as prepared
under the traditional Hebrew rules and requirements or dietary laws.~ Pennsyl-
vania similarly denes both kosher and kosher style as a food product having
been prepared, processed, manufactured, maintained, and vended in accordance
with the requisites of traditional Jewish law.97
Only a small number of prosecutions have been brought under the kosher
food laws. One interpretation of this statistic is that the statutes are ineectual
Particularly in states where the major state ocials enforce the kosher food
laws, the statutes may have minimal eect because state budgets fail to allocate
funds specically for kosher food law
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enforcement.98 In questioning the need for such legislation altogether one
comment notes that such legislation is little more than a desire by various groups
to appear to be solving a problem... for politicians, kosher food legislation is
a cheap way to do 'something' for the Jewish community. ~ Alternatively, the
very small number of prosecutions brought could indicate that the statutes
serve a deterrent function, thus reducing the necessity of prosecution. The mere
existence of kosher food legislation might act as a deterrent to fraudulent kosher
purveyors who fear the personal and economic ramications of an investigation,
not to mention a pro5ecution.'00 Ideally, this is the way FDA enforcement should
work under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.
A more likely reason that few prosecutions have been brought is the fact
such laws are inherently unenforceable.10' The denition of traditional Jewish
law varies innitely depending on who is asked. The substance that these laws
attempt to create no more provides a baseline standard than the original FDA
policy guideline. The majority of the states use some form of the phrase Or-
thodox Hebrew requirements. Yet, as discussed above, even among Orthodox
authorities, there is no absolute consensus regarding many of the particulars of
the dietary laws. Any enforcement authority is forced to create its own sub-
stantive standards in order to carry out its functions. For example, the New
York statute creates a kosher advisory board to assist the Commissioner of the
Department of Agriculture and Markets.'0' One factor in the recent New Jersey
cases was the existence of a similar state kosher advisory committee composed
often rabbis, nine Orthodox and one Conservative.'04 The attempt to refer to a
concrete set of standards, as in the Illinois statute, also falls short. The Code
of Jewish Law is unlike a secular legislative code; it includes various opinions
without laying down the nal rule that is observed today.
The ambiguity of these standards repeatedly led to litigation. Initially, chal-
lenges to the kosher food laws based themselves on claims of unconstitutional
vagueness, and such claims are routinely raised today as part of any challenge
to the validity of the laws. The issue was considered resolved by the United
States Supreme Court ruling in Hygrade Provision Co. v Sherman,'05 holding
that the term 'kosher' has a meaning well enough dened to enable one en-
gaged in the trade to correctly apply it. Recently, in Barghout,'06 the plainti
argued that sellers are at the mercy of individual inspectors licensed to apply
personal standards on what is correctly kosher. The court observed that Bargh-
out, himself, implied that the understood the term when he advertised that he
sold 'kosher' hot dogs. He should realize that customers desiring 'kosher' prod-
ucts would understand the term.'07 The New Jersey court in Ran-Day's made
a similar observation: It is actually somewhat disingenuous for plaintis to say
that kosher is an indenite term. They hold themselves out to be purveyors of
kosher food. They know that their many customers rely upon them and their
supervising rabbi to be knowledgeable concerning the various requirements to
designate their products as 'kosher' within the generally accepted meaning of
the word'08
Although the denition of kosher may be clear enough to prevent arbitrary
16enforcement, the State is still involved in determining and applying a religious
standard.
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Because of the inherent inability of the legislatures to dene explicit stan-
dards, some degree of State involvement is unavoidable, and raises serious con-
stitutional questions.
The Establishment Clause
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.'09 Because kosher is a term with religious
implications, state regulation has led to a line of cases challenging the kosher
laws under the Establishment Clause. Recently, the New Jersey supreme court
became the rst to overturn one of the laws as an unconstitutional establishment
of religion.110 In light of these challenges several basic requirements emerge
which would inform any government attempt to draft such a statute. The law
must not favor one sect over another, it must not directly advance religion, it
must not create excessive government entanglement with religion, and it cannot
question the truth of sincerely held religious claims.'1'
Denominational Preference
The Supreme Court has said that [t]he clearest command of the Establish-
ment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be ocially preferred over
another. In a later case, the court again stated that whatever else the Establish-
ment Clause may mean. .. it certainly means at the very least that government
may not demonstrate a particular preference for one particular sect or creed.2
In their attempt to provide a substantive denition of kashrut, states may have
created such a preference. States that dene kosher as compliance with Or-
thodox Hebrew requirements categorically excludes well accepted Conservative
standards of kashrid. The existence of advisory boards consisting almost ex-
clusively of Orthodox rabbis involved in enforcement exacerbates the problem.
However, denominational preference challenges to the kosher food laws have not
been sustained in court.3 The recent ruling by the Maryland Court of Appeals
rejected such a challenge. The court reasoned that the term kosher means t
according to Orthodox principles, not according to the standards or any other
system of belief within Judaism. Barghout was guilty because by claiming the
hot dogs he sells are kosher [he] implies that his hot dogs meet the Orthodox
standards.114
Consumer expectations are often invoked to explain the constitutionality
of such a preference. Proponents argue that Orthodox Hebrew requirements
are what most people who keep kosher understand by the term. Since a clear
denition of kosher is necessary for the law to operate validly at all, and the
Orthodox Hebrew requirements most often represent the understanding and
wish of the kosher consumer, it's use in the statute should be acceptable.115
Consistent with this approach, the Barghout court noted that the city ordi-
nance at issue was drafted to protect people form unscrupulous vendors who try
to lure them into buying something less than what they are entitled to expect.6
The Lemon Test
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Since 1970, the Supreme court has analyzed challenges under the Estab-
lishment Clause using the three prong test developed in Lemon v Kurtzman,7
the single most inuential Establishment Clause case.8 In order to pass Con-
stitutional muster, a regulatory scheme must have a secular purpose, its pri-
mary eect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must
not create excessive government entanglement with religion.9 The kosher laws
clearly have a the secular purpose of preventing fraud, or misleading represen-
tations. Similarly, when viewed in the context of general consumer protection
legislation, it is dicult to conclude that the primary eect of these laws is to
advance religion. One possible objection argues that since the reason for target-
ing kosher fraud in particular is the moral harm it inicts on people attempting
to maintain religious standards, the law serves to advance religion.
Entanglement
The aspect of the Lemon test that creates the greatest problem for the
kosher laws is the entanglement test. According to the Lemon court, govern-
ment action is prohibited by the Establishment Clause if it creates excessive
administrative entanglement between church and state, or if it turns over tra-
ditionally governmental powers to religious institutions. This administrative
entanglement sometimes arises when religious and public employees must work
closely together in order to carry out the legislative plan.'20
The key case in this area is Larkin v Grendal's Den,'21 where the court con-
sidered a Massachusetts statute that gave churches and schools veto power over
liquor licenses for establishments within 500 feet of their grounds. The Court
overturned the statute because it delegated traditional governmental powers to
a religious institution: [the law] substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of
a church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body. The Court
also emphasized the excessive administrative entanglement involved, comment-
ing that the statute enmeshes churches in the processes of government.
The Court was troubled by the possibility that the secular power granted
to these groups could be employed for explicitly religious goals, for example,
favoring liquor licenses for members of that congregation or adherents of that
faith. An additional concern was that the mere appearance of a joint exercise of
legislative authority by Church and State provides a signicant symbolic benet
to religion in the minds of some by reason of the power conferred.
The Court's concern about misuse of power is not necessarily a problem in
the cases of kosher food regulation, since the decisions of the religious authorities
are prescribed by Jewish law. However, even the legitimate use of enforcement
power will have the eect of favoring specic sects, implicating the problem
raised above.
Because the kosher statutes refer to a body of law that is not laid out as
statutory code but is subject to interpretation and application, there is an un-
avoidable need for
1915
rabbinic advisement in enforcing the regulatory scheme. However, the in-
volvement of religious authorities automatically implicates the entanglement
problem highlighted in Larkin.
In Ran-Day's the enforcement authorities were assisted by the State Kosher
Advisory Committee, a body appointed by the New Jersey Attorney General,
consisting of ten rabbis. The court held that the Attorney General's selection of
rabbis to hold positions of criminal law enforcement violated the entanglement
test: Because [the committee members] are being used by and for the State
in their religious capacity to interpret and enforce state law, the religious and
civil authority possessed by them is virtually indistinguishable.122 Although
the committee acted in a purely advisory manner, and did not wield broad
discretionary powers, it was an ocial government entity, and the Larkin court
warned of the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by
Church and State. Although the legislature and the Attorney General might
have asked the rabbinate only for advice on how to draft and enforce the law
eectively, Larkin would seem to prevent the creation of a standing governmental
entity made up entirely of religious gures.','2 ~
Judicial Involvement in Religious Disputes
A greater concern related to entanglement is the involvement of the courts in
resolving religious disputes. The determination of what is kosher is inherently
a religious question. As discussed above, early challenges to the kosher laws
based themselves on the diculty of determining a suciently denite and clear
standard that would allow for secular implementation. Traditionally, courts
have brushed o this problem by alluding to a well accepted industry standard
or by assuming a general uniformity.'24
In addressing the question of vagueness, courts relied on a generally ac-
cepted industry standard, and this assertion is also used to minimize the issue
of State involvement in religious disputes. Reliance on industry norms is a well
established legal principle in whole areas of the law such as contracts, and has
been routinely applied in construing the kosher laws. For example, the stan-
dard of strict compliance with every law and custom adopted in the California
statute was interpreted by the courts to refer to compliance with general indus-
try norms.125 One article assumes that [i]f a butcher misrepresented whether
a piece of meat is from a cow or a pig, or whether an animal was slaughtered
properly, these issues could sustain an action for fraud without constitutional
diculty. The use of the word kosher is simply a shorthand for such factual
statements. While there is certainly much unclarity at the edges of the laws of
kashrut, certain principles are suciently clear|particularly to people in the
trade|and suciently
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factual that there ought to be no constitutional diculty in regulating them.
... The
deviant who aunts these norms overstep s the bounds of consumer expectations
and should be reachable for the fraud that he is perpetrating on unknowing
customers.
20Those who argue for industry norms as an applicable standard concede that
there are problematic gray areas. Stern develops a case where the overwhelming
consensus of
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legal opinion is to require a certain practice, but a minority rabbinic opinion
permits a more relaxed practice. The consumer may reasonably assume that a
butcher follows the majority practice, and hence is, in a sense, defrauded when
the butcher, perhaps because it is cheaper to rely on the minority opinion, does
so. But allowing the State to insist on the majority rule is to allow the state to
control decisionmaking under Jewish law. . ,,127
Initially, the State in Ran-Day's maintained that there could be one uni-
form interpretation of kashrut. In an argument similar to those raised above
regarding denominational preference, the State maintained that disputes would
be infrequent and inconsequential because all branches of Judaism recognize
and agree that there is a single historical standard of kosher determination.'28
The supreme court rejected this analysis, asserting that [b]ecause of varying
doctrinal interpretations, varying degrees of trust that members of some sects
place in the food supervisors of other sects, and varying 'shades of observance'
undertaken by individual Jews, no one practice can be called 'the only true Ju-
daism.' Disputes may occur infrequently, but when they do, they are ineluctably
religious in tenor and content.129
The denition of the term kosher as prepared in accordance with Orthodox
requirements, does not provide a uniform standard that would resolve this ques-
tion. The legislature has only forced the courts to resolve disputes regarding
the Orthodox approach. In Ran-Day's itself, the store was supervised by an
Orthodox rabbi.
Even if a reliable industry norm existed, fatal ambiguity is injected by the
question of sincerely held variant beliefs. Traditionally, the harshness of deci-
sions holding vendors to the State's interpretation of Orthodox requirements
was mitigated by judicial assertions that sincerely held beliefs regarding kashrut
would not be challenged. The Hygrade approach, cited repeatedly down through
the line of cases, held that whatever diculty there may be in reaching a correct
determination as to whether a given product is kosher, appellants are unduly
apprehensive since they are not required to act at their peril but only to exercise
their judgment in good faith. .. .By engaging in the business of selling kosher
products they in eect assert an honest purpose to distinguish to the best of
their judgment between what is and what is not kosher.'30 United States v Bal-
lard, a famous case dealing with religious fraud, established that a court may
look only to the sincerity rather than the truth of the defendant's beliefs.'3'
The kosher laws address this problem by explicitly or implicitly requiring
knowledge or intent to defraud.'32 The Maryland court recently provided an
expansive denition of intent to defraud: an untrue representation has been
'knowingly' made if by one who knows it is untrue, believes it is untrue or is quite
aware that he has not the slightest notion whether it is true or not. 'n Practically,
however, the intent requirement is a standard that is almost impossible to apply,
since the only one who has true knowledge of the defendant's beliefs is the one
on trial. As much as the exception for sincerely held beliefs is a necessity to
prevent unconstitutional state interference in religious disputes, when it goes
beyond the industry norms that form the basis for State regulation, it seriously
22handicaps the State's ability to protect consumer expectations.
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In Ran-Day's, the State initially adhered to the Hygrade approach and took
the position that government involvement in disputes over meaning could be
avoided by the simple expedient of not deciding them, writing that 'where Or-
thodox Jewish authorities dispute the force or requirement of a particular def-
inition of kosher, the State is precluded from choosing one interpretation over
the other'; the bureau would not enforce the regulations against a purveyor
who had adopted a variant interpretation of kashrut based on sincerely held
beliefs.4 However, if the term kosher is to have any substantive meaning, there
must be some limit to the variance that is accepted. The State in RanDay's
would impose such a limit in the name of consumer expectations. The court
found that the State had changed its initial position to hold that because of
consumer expectations, a merchant's or his supervising rabbi's variant, albeit
good faith religious belief that under Orthodox Jewish law, pork is kosher, may
be regulated by the State. u
Because the State insists on setting its own substantive standard, courts
will inevitably become involved in litigating these standards As the New Jersey
court explained, [t]he Attorney General has acknowledged that the Bureau of
Enforcement would be obligated under the kosher regulations to obtain injunc-
tions against merchants adhering to their own understandings of Jewish law in
general and Jewish Orthodoxy in particular. The conclusion is inescapable that
if a merchant did not adhere to Jewish Orthodoxy, as perceived by the Bureau
of Enforcement, and the State legally challenged the merchant's right to sell
his or her products as kosher, a court would have to resolve whether the mer-
chant's view of kashru/ diverged from the State's denition of Orthodoxy. It
is dicult to envision a civil controversy stamped more indelibly with religious
doctrine.'~'6
Federal Approaches
After progressing through all the possible defenses, it appears that a Fed-
eral standard modeled on those of the states would not survive Constitutional
scrutiny. Many of the problems raised in the state law cases arise because the
government is unable to apply a denitive factual standard to the case. One
obvious solution is to create such explicit factual standards. As discussed above,
there are practical problems involved in creating a precise denition for the word
kosher. The provisions of Jewish law are too complex to be codied in a food
identity standard; even hearings as extensive as those on the bread standard
would not resolve the issue. However, limited regulation of terms is more feasi-
ble. For example, the use of the words kosher style have been treated separately
in legislation. The FDA policy statement discourages the term because it will
mislead consumers into thinking the product is kosher.~r The New Jersey'38
and New York139 allow such a label, but it is subject to the same conditions
under which the state permits the use of term kosher. At the other extreme, the
Georgia regulations provide that nothing contained in this Code section shall
prohibit the use of the words Kosher type or Kosher style food.'40 More specic
terms of this type are easier to regulate than the general kosher rubric.
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Similarly, both New York and New Jersey have regulations regarding the
label pareve, which under Jewish law is a claim to be completely free of meat
or dairy. As mentioned above, the integrity of such a claim is of special concern
to several secular groups such as vegetarians and those with milk allergies. The
New York statute provides:
It shall be unlawful to label food or food products with the words parve~~
or pareve or in any way to indicate that the food or food product may be used
or consumed indiscriminately with meat, poultry, or dairy products according
to Orthodox-Hebrew requirements when such food or food products are imper-
missible of such use or consumption141 A similar Illinois statute, again attempts
to be more specic, making it unlawful to use the label knowing that such food
or food products contain milk, meat, or poultry products rendering such food
products impermissible to be used or eaten according to the Code of Jewish
Laws.'42 The denition of pareve is tricky only as regards the equipment used
in manufacture. However, technically such a denition would be vastly easier to
develop than one for the much more all encompassing term, kosher. One con-
sumer advocate argues that keeping kosher would be a lot easier if all products
were clearly and consistently marked as to their kosher status, and the symbols
used did not lead to so much confusion for the consumer. Legislative assistance
[could help] achieve a system that specically labels each kosher product pareve,
dairy, meat, dairy equipment (pareve products that have been manufactured on
equipment that retains its dairy gender) meat equipment, sh (so as to avoid
using such products with meat) and Passover. One proposal for standardization
uses an English language based system where pareve would be designated N for
neutral, while P would be reserved for Passover, eliminating the confusion that
results when the same letter is used to represent both terms143
Disclosure
A recent New York Times editorial describes the advantages of disclosure
laws as an alternative to direct regulation. If regulation is chosen, disclosure
is often the best method. With it, taxpayers save the cost of the bureaucracy
that regulation often brings, the public gets more information to make pur-
chasing and job decisions, and companies avoid the cost and coerciveness of
traditional regulation.1 In the realm of kosher regulation, such provisions would
have the added benet of avoiding constitutional charges. The idea would be to
force manufacturers claiming kashrui supervision to disclose the basis for such
supervision, either on the label or in a public ling.
The New Jersey supreme court in Ran Day's noted that the state clearly has
an interest in regulating the advertising and labeling of kosher products, and
that this task can be accomplished eectively within the limits of the Constitu-
tion. The regulation could require those who advertise food products as kosher
to disclose the basis on which the use of that characterization rests.., indicating
the form of rabbinical supervision. Such an approach would thus make use of
the kosher foods industry's existing scheme of selfregulation.'45
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The state would simply be enforcing the truth of a factual representation.
Just as the state may bar promotion of products ads having been tested by
a certain testing laboratory when they have not been so tested, and just as
the State may bar promotion of products as having been endorsed by a certain
consumer magazine when they have not been so endorsed, so may the State
bar promotion of products as having been prepared under the supervision of
a particular rabbi or group of rabbis when they have not been so prepared.
Such a consumer protection law would be based on neutral, secular principles,
and would be perfectly compatible with the constitutional strictures against
governmental establishment of religion.'46
Many of the state statutes have taken this route, relying on both public
registration and disclosure measures to supplement or replace more substantive
enforcement. Under the New Jersey regulations, any dealer claiming to be under
rabbinical supervision must le a letter from the supervising rabbi or rabbinical
agency including the name and address of the person providing the certica-
tion, the date the letter was issued, the date it becomes eective, the date it
expires, the name and address of the dealer receiving certication and the type
of establishment certied. At the same time, any individual giving rabbinical
supervision to any dealer located in New Jersey must annually le a document
listing the name, address and type of each establishment that is supervised.'47
Such regulations balance the requirements between the manufacturers, the su-
pervising authorities and the kosher consumers who must then investigate the
claims.
New York statutes require registration of all products making kosher claims.
The regulations provide: Any food commodity in package form which is certied
by an organization, identied by any symbol, or is marked as being kosher for
Passover shall not be oered for sale by the producer or distributor of such
food commodity until thirty days after such certifying organization, producer
or distributor shall have registered the name, current address and telephone
number of the supervising rabbi with the ~~148 Illinois has virtually identical
regulations requiring registration.'49 Similar New York regulations require that,
all advertisements for food or food products sold as kosher under Rabbinical
supervision must identify the name of the rabbi or organization, if any certifying
such food or food product as being kosher.150 Other states, including Ohio and
Maryland also require disclosure in advertising.
Following litigation challenging the constitutionality of its laws, Maryland
has rewritten its state statutes during the past year. The substantive require-
ment that use of the term kosher conform to the Code of Jewish law has been
replaced by mandatory disclosure statements and advertising regulations. 151
Unfortunately, this simple and denitive solution does not really address
the problem that kosher laws were designed to target. Under general principles
of fraud, the state could always prosecute a vendor who claimed to be under
supervision and was in fact under none at all. However, supervision at issue
is not merely a question of having someone watch the food while it is being
prepared. Kosher consumers are being harmed by supervision that represents
26itself as meeting certain principles of Jewish law. For many
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consumers who don't understand the intricate details of kashrul regulation,
the disclosure that a product is in fact under some type of supervision will
not prevent deception about substantive standards. For example, in Ran-Day's
itself, the store was under the supervision of an Orthodox rabbi, yet inspec-
tors found several deviations from mainstream Jewish law that the State felt
confounded consumer expectations. It may be that Constitutionally, the gov-
ernment should have no role in this determination, but it is wrong to pretend
that disclosure could protect consumers as completely.
Federal Disclosure Laws
In comments regarding the repeal of x 101.29 from the CFR, one comment
requested that as part of a new compliance policy guide, FDA create and main-
tain a certicate for domestic and imported products that would contain infor-
mation regarding the manufacturer, certifying rabbi and organization, eective
dates of the certicate, and symbols used in product labeling. [Sluch a certi-
cate, publicly available upon request, could greatly assist consumers in deciding
whether the food in question meets their personal needs, because they would
have access to information identifying not only the manufacturer but also the
certifying organization.'52
In 1990, Representative Stephen Solarz introduced a bill to amend the Fed-
eral Food Drug and Cosmetic Act to require the ling of certain consumer in-
formation pertaining to religious dietary certication symbols on food labels.153
Such legislation would accommodate concerns about both kosher labeling, and
labels certifying Muslim food as halal.
The proposed bill was based on congressional ndings that more and more
labels bear symbols indicating products have been under religious dietary su-
pervision, and consumers seeking foods that have been so certied, whether
for religious reasons, health reasons, or any other reasons, are entitled to as-
sume that the foods bearing religious dietary certication symbols have in fact
been certied as represented and to have access to certain basic information
concerning such religious dietary certication symbols.154
The bill would require a copy of a certication letter and a public disclosure
statement to be kept on le with the secretary. The certication letter would
be a written statement signed by a certifying authority declaring that the food
conforms to religious dietary standards. The disclosure statement would be a
form including the name of the food, the name, address and telephone number
of the manufacturer, the address of the plant, a copy of the certication sym-
bol, the mane address and phone number of the certifying authority, and any
other information the secretary prescribes, including the religious aliations
and educational qualications of the certifying authority.'55
Any false disclosure claims could be prosecuted under the federal fraud
laws.'56 Again, however, such an approach does not provide comprehensive reg-
ulation of statements or representations that are merely misleading. An im-
mediately available, well presented label claim has an overwhelming advantage
against a public ling that in itself
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provides no guidance to many consumers unfamiliar with the various super-
visory authorities.
An alternative approach might combine disclosure with the idea of limited
substantive standards discussed above. Rather than working with the term
kosher which is fraught with religious controversy, the agency could create ar-
bitrary markings or terms that will be correlated with specic standards. The
letter A could indicate compliance with a specic standard of Jewish law, B
could accommodate certain variations, C could signify still others. Manufac-
turers would still be able to use the term kosher, but kosher A, would provide
some meaningful disclosure to consumers on the label itself This approach of
designating random labels to represent specic standards, is consistent with the
government development of identity standards for food, but by moving away
from denitions of kosher it shifts the debate to the secular realm.
Delegation of Enforcement
Given the limited enforcement ability of the FDA, an alternative to a federal
solution, would be to create systematic government regulation, but delegate
enforcement to the state or local authorities, or agencies such as local boards of
health.157
Privatization
A second alternative to government regulation is privatization. Options
include private civil suits, as well as regulation within the existing framework
of private supervisory agencies and independent industry organizations.
The idea of a self-policing industry is an attractive one. The legitimate
kosher industry that is willing to spend the time and money to acquire qual-
ied supervision has a strong interest in preventing fraud. The industry also
has technical expertise and specialized knowledge regarding feasibility and cost
eectiveness in devising solutions. One advocate uses the model of the National
Advertising Division which serves as a source of guidance to the food advertising
industry and also investigates and resolves disputes. 158
Independent food commissions provide another forum for industry regula-
tion. A classic model is the actions of the Florida Citrus Commission during
a recent citrus freeze. When the price of orange juice escalated due to lim-
ited supply, fraudulent adulteration of orange juice became widespread. The
Florida Citrus Commission responded by appropriating funds for the investiga-
tion of adulterated orange juice. By protecting its own economic interests in
maintaining standards of quality, the Commission also protected
'59
unwary consumers.
Other forms of religious labeling have adopted the self-regulatory approach.
Foods formulated and processed for the rapidly expanding Islamic food market
may contain the special wording halal or according to Islamic laws or Muslim
food.
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The Islamic Food and Nutrition Council of America (IFANCA) and the Mus-
lim Consumer Group for Food Products provide consultancy services. These
organizations help food technologists to develop products that conform to Is-
lamic food laws. They also oer supervision and certication for foods and meat
slaughtered according to halal standards. The symbol lvi enclosed in a crescent
signies that the product has been certied as halal by IFANCA.'60
Another example of an independent body with goals of consumer protection
is the New York State Kosher Food Advisory Council. The Council was created
by Governor Cuomo in 1985, to address issues of concern to the kosher consumer.
One of the main thrusts of this Council's activities has been the examination of
kosher food pricing.'6'
Several people have argued that kosher supervision should be left entirely to
the religious community. [Tihe worst aspect of the kosher food laws is not the
doubts about their constitutionality, but the fact that they lessen the responsi-
bility of the rabbinate for kosher food enforcement, because it is easier to refer
matters to the State kosher food ocer than publicly to challenge the decisions
of some other rabbi or challenge a local merchant.'62
Another article takes a long range view, observing that [tihe American Jew-
ish community will be best served by managing the problems of contemporary
Judaism on their own, and not by providing the opening through which govern-
ment can interject itself into the nation's religious aairs. ,,163
Supporters of full privatization still concede that very sophisticated criminal
frauds may be beyond the power of an individual rabbi to detect, as would be
the case of a slaughter house under kosher supervision doubled its production
by operating a shadow non-kosher plant but using the same kosher packaging.
It is as legitimate for government to put a stop to this type of fraud as to stop
fraud regarding the labeling of natural or organic foods.'64
A more prevalent problem with this degree of privatization is that it pro-
vides no protection for the kosher consumers outside the Orthodox Jewish
community.'65 As reiterated throughout this paper, these groups without tech-
nical knowledge of the dietary laws are the ones most in need of protection from
fraudulent claims.
Education
The most hands-o' approach involves education concerning truthful food




disseminate non-biased information. Lim rces make this approach im-
practical.
Alternatively, trade associations could publish educational information about
products which their members produce.'67
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A number of organizations have adopted this approach. The New York
Council recently prepared a consumer booklet in conjunction with the Gov-
ernor's oce, entitled A Shopping Guide for the Kosher Consumer, to assist
consumers in making wiser decisions concerning kosher food purchases and to
provide information about what to do in case of problems. Topics include: how
to know when a product is kosher, are all kosher products marked with a kosher
certication? how to determine if a product is meat, dairy or pareve kosher meat
and poultry and their prices, and kosher food and health considerations.'68
Trade associations have also seen the benets of education. The Beef In-
dustry Council of the National Livestock and Meat Board has produced an
information and recipe booklet for the kosher consumer. The booklet should
provide the kosher consumer with additional information about important as-
pects of dealing with kosher meat, such as kosher slaughter and proper kashering
of meat procedures. The association benets because the booklet should also
provide kosher butchers with a useful tool for marketing their merchandise.'69
The educational approach is especially relevant since the key problem with
privatization is the unavailability of ready information to the consumer. Any
alternative to direct regulation must compete with a glaring label that appears
professional and authoritative. If information is not provided on the label it
must be just as accessible in order to be eective.
Conclusion
The analysis in this paper has see-sawed back and forth, repeatedly con-
fronting the same legal and logistical constraints. The State wants to protect
consumers whose religious or ethical beliefs make them susceptible to kosher
claims (like the weight-conscious consumers in the Diet Thins case). On one
hand, any regulatory scheme must provide a substantive standard in order to
have some baseline to determine noncompliance. However, because the dietary
laws are so complex and situation specic, it is impossible to create a single list
of requirements. The standards that have been developed have been forced to
rely on generalized assumptions. These generalities in turn raise Constitutional
problems by enmeshing the State in determination and application of religious
principles. Although consumers may have expectations based on certain reli-
gious standards, manufacturers who want to capitalize on such expectations,
can hide behind a claim of divergent religious beliefs protected by the Consti-
tution. The only way the State can create a non-invasive, neutral standard is
through mere investigation of disclosure claims, yet such an approach does not
directly confront the original problem of consumer expectations.
Under the circumstances, the best short range solution is the combination of
disclosure with some sort of limited substantive regulation as described above{if
not of the word kosher itself, at least of some of the closely identied terms and
symbols. However, because of the government resources that would be required,
such a regulatory
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approach is unlikely to proceed. At the same time, the steps taken toward
education are very encouraging. Education by industry groups and consumer
advocates presents the most practical approach, with the greatest potential for
ultimately curbing the market by empowering the consumer. Such an approach
also alerts the consumer to take responsibility for investigating products and
claims, making pure disclosure a more eective option for the future.
1 Sossins Systems, Inc. v City of Miami Beach, 262 So.2d 28 (1972)
2
Engel v Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)
'~ Beatrice Trum Hunter, More Consumers Ask: Is it Kosher?, Consumers'
Research Magazine, Apr. 1997, at 10
David Hochman, You Don't Have to be Jewish to Love This Business, New York
Times, Apr. 4, 1993, at F9
<http://www.kosherfest.com> (the ocial internet site of the U.S. kosher food
industry)
6
Joe M Regenstein and Carrie Regenstein, Looking in on Kosher Supervision
of the
food industry, 39 Judaism 408 (1990)
Joshua Hammerman, The Forbidden Oreo, New York Times Magazine, Jan.
11, 1998
8 Hochman, supra note 4, at F9
9Id.
10 Hammerman, supra note 7
~ Hochman, supra note 4, at F9
12 Menachem Genack, Industrial Kashrut Supervision, 39 Judaism 402, 407
(1990)
'~ Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah xx 79-80
The Shulhan Arukh (literally, set table) is the Code of Jewish Law. Written by
Rabbi
Yoseph Karo in the 1 6~ century, it denes Jewish law in light of centuries of
study and
debate and is accepted as authoritative throughout the Jewish world. Citations
are to
chapters in the section entitled Yoreh Deah which deals with permitted and
forbidden
substances.
~ Yoreh Deah x 83 Id., at xx 29-60
16 Id., at xx 65-68
17
Id., at x 65
18
Id., at x 64
'~' Id., at xx 1-27
20
32Id., at xx 69-78
21 Id., at xx 98-111
22 Barghout v Mayor and City Council, 325 Md. 311
23 Yoreh Deah, supra note 13, at xx 87-97
24 Id.
25 Id., x 82
26 Gerald Masoudi, Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 60 U.Chi.L.Rev. 667 (1993)
27 Id., 36-39
3325
28 Mark Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause, 26
Colum.J.L. & Soc.Probs. 1, 8-10 (1992). See notes 32-43 and accompanying
text
29 Id.
30 Genack, supra note 12, at 404
~' Generic declaration of avors in the ingredient statement is permitted by
section
403(i)(2) of the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.
32 Id., at 402
~ Incidental additives that are present in a food at insignicant lev-
els and do not have any
technical or functional eect in the food are exempt from declaration in
ingredient labeling
under 21 C.F.R. x 101.100(a)(3)
~ Genack, supra note 12, at 405
See also Kof-K kosher supervision (visited Jan. 13, 1998) Khttp://www.kofk.comllabel.htm>
'~ Id.
36 Gedaliah Dov Schwartz, Kashruth|Problems and Solutions, 39 Judaism 427
(1990)
~ Id.
38 Berman supra note 28, at 8
~ Regenstein and Regenstein, supra note 6, at 408
~ Yoreh Deah, supra note 13, at x 98
411d.,atx 115
42 Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah I, 47-49 (responsa containing legal decisions)
~ Schwartz, supra note 36, at 428




48 Shelley Meacham, Answering to a Higher Source~ Does the Establishment
Clause
Actually Restrict Kosher Regulations as Ran-Day's County Kosher Proclaims?
23
Sw.U.L.Rev. 639, 647,648
'~ Hunter, supra note 3, at 10
50 Hunter, supra note 3, at 14
~' Hochman, supra note 4, at F9
52 Keeping Foods Kosher, Healthy!, Mar. 1997 (visited Jan. 22, 1998)
<http:/www.treeolife.com/9703.htm>
~ <http//www. primenet . comA-kosher/about. htm
~ Hunter, supra note 3, at 11
~ Barghout, supra note 22, at 326
56 Id. (citation)
~' Id.
3458 The USDA regulates labels on meat and poultry
~~21 U.S.C. x 331
6021U5C x343(a)
61 21 U S C x 321(n)
3526
62
Fara Warner, What Happened to the Truth? Adweek's Marketing Week,
Oct. 1991, 4-
5





66 Id. at 749
67 Nicole Imamshah and Nicole Rao, Federal Food and Drug Act Violations,
34
AmCrim.L.Rev. 645, notes 97-99 and accompanying text
68 Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law, 53 (1991)
69 See court analysis in United States v Ninety-ve barrels of ... Apple Cider
Vinegar,
265 U.S. 438
70 21 U.S.C. x 341 provides: XVhenever in the judgment of the Secretary such
action will
promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers, he shall pro-
mulgate regulations xing and establishing for any food.., a reasonable denition
and standard of identity....
71 Hutt and Merrill, supra note 68, at 96
72 Id., at 107
~ 104 Stat. 2353 (1990) (codied as amended at 21 USC xx 301,
321, 337, 343, 343-1,
345, 371
~ Bruce Silverglade, Food Labeling: Rules You Can Live By, LEGAL TIMES,
July 17,
1995, at 21
(examination of consumer, industry and agency responses to FDA regulation of
food
labels under NLEA, cited in Imamshah and Rao)
~ Beatrice Trum Hunter, Food for Thought: Legal, but...., Con-
sumers' Research
Magazine, Nov. 1995
76 See Hutt and Merrill, supra note 68, at 59
See also Suzanne Hamlin, Free Range? Natural? Sorting Out Labels, New York
Times,
November 13, 1996, at LI
~ This summary is based on Roseann Termini, The Prevention of Misbranded









83 N.J.Admin.Code tit.13, x45A-21
84 Peter Barton Hutt, Class discussion, Harvard Law School, January 1998
85 cited in Termini, supra note 77, notes 143 and 144
86 cited in Masoudi supra note 26, note 30
87 Barghout, supra note 22, at 319
88 Catherine Beth Sullivan, Kosher Food Laws and the Establishment Clause,
21 B.C.Envtl.A.L.Rev. 201, at 210
89NYAgric & Mkts.Law x 201-a
~ See Commack Self-Service Kosher Meats v Rubin, 1997 WL 774763
(E.D.N.Y.)
3727
~' Cai.Penai Code x 3 83(b)
92 410 ILCS 645/1
For an explanation of the Shulchan Aruch see supra note 13
~ Md ComL s 14-901
~ Mich.Comp.Laws F 750.297e
~ Minn.Stat. xx 3 1.651
~ Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. xx 36-94 1
~ l8Pa.Cons.Stat. x 4107.1
98 Sullivan, supra note 88 at 211
~ Marc Stern, Kosher Food and the Law, 39 Judaism 389 (1990).
at 397 100 Sullivan, supra note 88 at 211
~01 Sullivan raises this issue as well, see supra note 88, at 212
102 Eighteen states (Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) explicitly incorpo-
rate the Orthodox
requirements into their statutes.
103 NY Agri. & Mkts x 26-a
104 Ran-Day's County Kosher v State, 608 A.2d 1353, at 1361 (1992)
105 266 U.S. 497 (1925)
106
see supra note 18
107 Id., 846-847
108 Id., 847 (citation)
109 US Const, Amend I
110 See supra note 104
~ See Masoudi, supra note 26, at 696
112 Cited in Masoudi, supra note 26, at 674
113 Id., at 676
' Barghout, supra note 22, at 325
~ Stern, supra note 99, at 399
116 Supra note 22, at 320
' 403 US 602, 612-13 (1971)
118 Berman, supra note 28, at 30
119 Cited in Masoudi, supra note 26, at 679
120 Id., at 683
121 459 US 116 (1982) The discussion of this case is paraphrased from Ma-
soudi, Id., at
683-88
122 Ran-Day's, supra note 104, at 1364-5
123 Masoudi, supra note 28, at 688
124 See Hygrade Provision Co. v Sherman 266 U.S. 497, 501 (the term 'kosher'
has a
38meaning well enough dened to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly
apply it) 125 Erlich v Municipal Court of Beverly Hills Judicial Dist. 360 P.2d
334 (1961)
cited in 52 A.L.R. 959 (1974)
126 Stern, supra note 99, at 398
127 Id., at 397
3928
128 Ran-Day's, supra note 104, at 1362
129 Id.
130 Hygrade, supra note 124, at 501-2
~' 130 U.S. 78(1944), at 81
132 Berman, supra note 28, at 20
133 Barghout, supra note 22, at 320
134 Ran-Day's, supra note 104, at 1362-63
135 Id., at 1363
136 Id.
137
see supra note 80
138 NJ Statute, supra note 83
139 NY Statute, supra note 89
140 Ga. Stat. 26-2-331
N.Y.Agri. & Mkts. x 201-h
142 IL Statute, supra note 92
143 Regenstein and Regenstein, supra note 6, at 419-420
' Josh Feltman, Disclosure Laws Can Regulate Gently, New York Times,
October, 3, 1993, F9
's Ran-Day's, supra note 104, at 1366
146 Id.
'~' Supra note 83
148 N.Y.Agri. & Mkts. x201-e
149 Supra note 92
150 Supra note 148
151 1997 Maryland Laws Ch. 376, 377 (SB. 630)
152 Supra note 80, at 43072-3
153 HR. 5447 (1990)
154 Id.
~ Id.
156 Id., reference to 18 U.S.C. x 1001
'Sullivan, supra note 88, at FN1 23 (State agencies currently responsible for
enforcing
state kosher laws include the state agricultural department, the state depart-
ment of public
health, or a designated segment of the state attorney general's oce)
158 Termini, supra note 77, at 106
159 Id., at 107
160
Hunter, supra note 3, at 14
161 Regenstein and Regenstein, supra note 6, at 417-418
162 Stern, supra note 99, at 400
163 Berman, supra note 28, at 75
164 Stern, supra note 99, at 397
165 Meacham, supra note 48, at 647-8
40166 Termini, supra note 77, at 107
167 Id., at 108
168 Regenstein and Regenstein, supra note 6, at 418
4129
169 Id., at 418
42